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Death Penalty Law

by Therese M. Day*
This Article provides a survey of death penalty case law in Georgia
from June 1, 2006 through May 31, 2007. The cases include those that
were heard by the Georgia Supreme Court on interim appeal and direct
appeal,1 and discussion is limited to claims which present new issues of
law, refine existing law, or are otherwise instructive. This Article does
not discuss holdings in capital cases that are common to all criminal
appeals because these are discussed elsewhere in this Survey.
I.
A.

DECISIONS OF THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT

Interim Review Cases

The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed four cases pursuant to interim
appellate review of death penalty cases under the Unified Appeal
Procedure.2
In Bailey v. State,3 Phillip Ray Bailey was indicted for murder and
other crimes, and the State filed its notice to seek the death penalty.
The court granted Bailey's application for interim review and directed
the parties to address whether the trial court erred in denying Bailey's
motion to quash his indictment when a clerical error resulted in the
misspelling of the first name of a grand juror.4
According to the record, "A man named Harvey D. Giddens was
summoned for grand jury service and served as one of the grand jurors

* Staff Attorney, Office of the Georgia Capital Defender, Atlanta, Georgia. San
Francisco State University (B.A., 1993); University of Arizona College of Law (J.D., 2002).
1. Due to space restrictions, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007), a
state habeas case, has been omitted.
2. GA. R. UNIFIED APP. P. I-IV; Stinski v. State, 281 Ga. 783, 642 S.E.2d 1 (2007);
Edwards v. State, 281 Ga. 108, 636 S.E.2d 508 (2006); Rice v. State, 281 Ga. 149, 635
S.E.2d 707 (2006); Bailey v. State, 280 Ga. 884, 635 S.E.2d 137 (2006).
3. 280 Ga. 884, 635 S.E.2d 137 (2006).
4. Id. at 884, 635 S.E.2d at 137.
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who indicted Bailey."5 Subsequently, Mr. Giddens's name was mistyped
as "Henry D. Giddens" when the list of grand jurors was transcribed to
Bailey's new indictment.6 Bailey filed a special demurrer, asserting
that he was entitled to an indictment perfect in form and substance, and
he requested his indictment to be quashed based on the misspelling.'
The court recognized that the standard requiring a perfect indictment
reflects the goal of providing trials free from harmful defects.8 However,
the court also noted that under the current version of the Official Code
of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") regarding the required elements of an
indictment, if the form substantially complies with the requirements of
the statute, the court must give full effect to any case when "a defendant's right to a fair trial will not be adversely affected."9 The court
concluded that "[iun Bailey's case, defense counsel [could] have easily
determined the identity of the grand juror whose name was misspelled
on Bailey's indictment."" Therefore, the court held that because the
misspelling of the grand juror's name was not material and because it
was clear that Bailey would not suffer prejudice, the trial court did not
err in overruling Bailey's special demurrer.1 Accordingly, the Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment.1
In Rice v. State," Lawrence Rice was charged with the murder of two
victims and related crimes, and the State announced its intent to seek
the death penalty.'4 The court granted Rice's application for interim
review and directed the parties to address three issues:
[1] whether the trial court erred in denying Rice's motion concerning
the composition of the grand and traverse jury lists; [2] whether the
trial court erred in ruling that the pretrial deposition testimony of
Trevor Mincher would be admissible at trial; and [3] whether the trial

5.

Id.

6. Id.
7. Id., 635 S.E.2d at 137-38.
8. Id., 635 S.E.2d at 138 (citing State v. Shepherd Constr. Co., 248 Ga. 1, 3, 281 S.E.2d
151, 155 (1981); State v. Eubanks, 239 Ga. 483, 488, 238 S.E.2d 38, 42 (1977)).
9. Id. at 885, 635 S.E.2d at 138 (citing O.C.G.A. § 17-7-54(a) (2004)).
10. Id.
11. Id. The court subsequently disapproved of the language in Bailey regarding
prejudice. See Wagner v. State, 282 Ga. 149, 646 S.E.2d 676 (2007). In Wagner the court
noted that while "questions of materiality and prejudice may be coextensive, harmless error
review is appropriate only in the post-conviction setting, not in pre-trial proceedings or on
pre-trial appeal." Id. at 150, 646 S.E.2d at 678. Therefore, the court disapproved of the
language in Bailey that could be construed to hold that a material defect that is not
prejudicial to the defendant does not require the quashing of the indictment. Id.
12. Bailey, 280 Ga. at 885, 635 S.E.2d at 138.
13. 281 Ga. 149, 635 S.E.2d 707 (2006).
14. Id. at 149, 635 S.E.2d at 708.
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court erred in refusing to allow a second pretrial deposition of Lillian
Heaton."

Rice first alleged that the lists from which his grand jury was drawn
and from which his traverse jury would be drawn were unconstitutional
because they reflected an underrepresentation of Hispanic persons."
The court ruled that Rice failed to demonstrate that Hispanics were
underrepresented. 7 In fact, according to the court, Rice's own expert
and evidence at the hearing supported a determination that there was
a slight overrepresentation of Hispanics in Cobb County.'" Therefore,
the court held that the trial court did not err in denying Rice's claim.' 9
In Rice's second claim, he alleged that the trial court erred in
admitting the pretrial deposition testimony of Trevor Mincher in
violation of Crawford v. Washington20 because Mincher died prior to the
trial and Rice did not have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine
him. 21 According to the record, the State filed a motion on March 9,
2005, seeking to take the pretrial deposition of Mincher, the husband of
the female victim and the father of the young male victim. 22 At the
hearing on March 16, 2005, Mincher testified that he had been
diagnosed with esophageal cancer which had metastasized. 23
He
further testified that while his doctors did not tell him there was no
hope of recovery, it was his belief that they would not "express a
complete lack of hope to him, even if no hope really existed." 24 The
trial court found that Mincher's medical condition satisfied the
requirements for taking pretrial depositions to preserve testimony in
criminal proceedings and allowed the State to proceed with direct
examination; however, the court acknowledged the defense's need for
"'adequate time to prepare for cross-examination"' and scheduled the
cross-examination portion of the deposition for March 31, 2005.25
Despite this ruling, the State requested Rice to begin cross-examination
following its direct examination. Before Rice could respond, the trial
court interjected and reiterated its prior ruling, noting the lack of notice

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
See Rice, 281 Ga. at 150, 635 S.E.2d at 709.
Id., 635 S.E.2d at 708.
Id.
Id.
Id., 635 S.E.2d at 709.
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and need for preparation 2prior
to cross-examination. Rice did not object
6
to the trial court's ruling.
At some time prior to the scheduled date for the cross-examination of
Mincher's deposition testimony, the State contacted Rice to inform him
that Mincher's health was failing and that he had been hospitalized.
Several hours later, Mincher died.27 Rice moved to exclude Mincher's
deposition testimony under Crawford based on the fact that the defense
did not have the opportunity to cross-examine Mincher. 28 The trial
court denied Rice's motion and stated:
"There was an opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Mincher. There
was notice. The Defense chose not to cross-examine him ....
It was
clear when he was sitting here that the man wasn't well. I don't
expect anybody anticipated his demise before we finished the deposi29
tion. I certainly didn't. I would have scheduled it sooner if I had."
The court held that the trial court was correct in ruling that Rice
waived his opportunity to cross-examine Mincher.3 ° The court determined that under statutory law, Rice had notice that the trial court
could order "the deposition [to] occur at any time within 30 days of the
hearing."31 The court acknowledged that while the opportunity to crossexamine Mincher was not ideal given the lack of more than six days
notice of the hearing, Rice was "afforded a sufficient opportunity for
cross-examination and . . . the lack of cross-examination ... [was] the
result of his waiving that opportunity."32 Accordingly, the court held
that the trial court did not err in ruling that Mincher's testimony was
admissible at trial.33
In Rice's third claim, he alleged error based on the trial court's denial
of his request for a second deposition of a State witness in order to
conduct further cross-examination. The State initially requested the
deposition of Lillian Heaton, the next door neighbor of the victims, and
her deposition was taken with the consent of Rice. During this
deposition, Rice learned that Heaton took several medications, including
Neurontin."4
When asked by defense counsel whether this drug

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 150-51, 635 S.E.2d at 709.
Id. at 151, 635 S.E.2d at 709.
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 24-10-130(f) (1995 & Supp. 2006)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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affected her memory, Heaton responded, "'No.' 35 Following her
testimony, the trial court "repeatedly directed defense counsel to consult
with his client and with co-counsel before finally accepting counsel's
statement that he had no further cross-examination."36 Ten months
following the deposition, Rice filed a motion for a second deposition,
stating that he had learned that Neurontin could have affected her
memory. The trial court denied the motion.37
The court noted that there was no case law on point regarding when
or whether a trial court is required to permit a second pretrial deposition; however, the court determined that case law governing when a trial
court may allow a witness to be recalled at trial was instructive.
Based on this line of cases, the court held that because Rice had the
opportunity to question Heaton about her medications and their effects,
the trial court did not err in denying a second deposition. 9 Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment.4 °
In Edwards v. State,4 Joseph Alan Edwards was indicted for murder
and related crimes, and the State filed its notice of intent to seek the
The court granted interim review and directed the
death penalty."
parties to address whether the trial court erred in denying Edwards's
motion to quash the indictment when the grand jury that returned the
indictment was selected from a list that reflected a 6.04% underrepresentation of white persons, a cognizable group.43
The claim arose when Edwards filed a pretrial motion challenging the
44
composition of the grand jury and traverse jury lists of Hall County.
During the pendency of Edwards's case, Hispanic persons were found to
be a cognizable group in Hall County, and the trial court held in another
death penalty case that Hispanic persons were underrepresented on Hall
County's jury lists.4 5 In an effort to construct a grand jury list that
represented a fair cross-section of the county's residents who were

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id., 635 S.E.2d at 710.

40.

Id.

41. 281 Ga. 108, 636 S.E.2d 508 (2006).
42. Id. at 108, 636 S.E.2d at 508.
43. Id. at 108-09, 636 S.E.2d at 508-09.
44. Id. at 108, 636 S.E.2d at 508-09.
45. Id., 636 S.E.2d at 509. In Smith v. State, 275
court affirmed the trial court's finding that Hispanic
Hall County but held that the defendant did not show
tation of Hispanic citizens. Id. at 726, 571 S.E.2d at

Ga. 715, 571 S.E.2d 740 (2002), the
persons were a cognizable group in
a legally-significant underrepresen749.

128

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

eligible to serve as jurors, the jury commission took measures to ensure
that it used the proper number of Hispanic citizens in its calculations.
However, it failed to make other adjustments including adjusting the
total population of all persons based on citizenship, resulting in an
underrepresentation of white persons on the grand jury by 6.04
percentage points.4 6
The court held that the trial court correctly found that an underrepresentation of a cognizable group by 6.04 percentage points was
generally not unconstitutional; however, the court held that it exceeded
the acceptable limit specified under the Unified Appeal Procedure,"
which requires significant underrepresentation of any cognizable group
to be corrected before trial.4 8 The court ruled that the only way to
correct the underrepresentation of white persons on Edwards's grand
jury list was for the trial court to quash Edwards's indictment.49
However, the court concluded that it could not require the trial court to
quash the indictment because such an order would exceed the court's
constitutional power.5" The court explained that while it had authority
under the state constitution and statutory law to promulgate rules, it did
not have the authority to abrogate or interfere with otherwise valid
statutory enactments, including the procedure by which prosecutors
procure indictments and conduct criminal prosecutions.5 1 The court
concluded that because the indictment had been procured in a manner
consistent with Georgia statutory law and with the federal and state
constitutions, the court did not have the authority to require the trial
court to quash Edwards's indictment.5 2 Therefore, the court affirmed
the trial court's decision not to quash Edwards's indictment.53
In Stinski v. State,5 4 Darryl Scott Stinski was indicted for two counts
of malice murder and related crimes, and the State filed its notice of
The Georgia Supreme Court
intent to seek the death penalty.55
granted interim review and directed the parties to address four issues,

46.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Edwards, 281 Ga. at 108-09, 636 S.E.2d at 509.
GA. R. UNIFIED App. P. II(c)(6)(b).
Edwards, 281 Ga. at 109-10, 636 S.E.2d at 509.
Id. at 110, 636 S.E.2d at 509-10.
Id., 636 S.E.2d at 510.
Id.
Id.
Id.
281 Ga. 783, 642 S.E.2d 1 (2007).
Id. at 783, 642 S.E.2d at 4.
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including whether the trial court erred in denying Stinski's motions
concerning the amended discovery statute.56
According to the record, Stinski filed a written notice of his election to
participate in the criminal discovery procedure pursuant to O.C.G.A.
sections 17-16-1 to 17-16-1057 on June 19, 2002.58 Subsequent to this
filing, the discovery statute was amended by the Criminal Justice Act of
2005'9 (the "Act"), which was made applicable to "all trials which
commence on or after July 1, 2005."s° Stinski challenged the
validity
61
of the Act and its applicability to his case on several bases.
Stinski first argued that the amended discovery provisions were
inapplicable to him because he elected to participate in the discovery
procedure prior to enactment of the Act.6 2 The court denied his claim,
reasoning that the Georgia General Assembly enacted the amendments
with knowledge of the existing discovery procedure and did not create an
exception for defendants with pending cases who had elected to
participate in the procedure prior to the changes.6 3 Accordingly, the
court held that the amendments to the discovery procedure were
applicable "to Stinski's case and that his previous election to participate
in that procedure continues to be binding upon him."'
Therefore,
Stinski was prevented from
opting
out
of
the
discovery
procedure
"as a
65
matter of statutory law."
The court also denied Stinski's claim that the amended discovery
procedure was unconstitutional because it failed to impose reciprocal
discovery obligations on the State.66 The court acknowledged that "the
two disclosures do seem, at first blush, to be unequal .
"..."67
However,
the court held that because the State is required to provide the same

56. Id. Stinski raised an additional argument alleging that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to quash the indictment based on the participation of an ineligible
grand juror. Id.
57. O.C.G.A. §§ 17-16-1 to -10 (2004 & Supp. 2006).
58. Stinski, 281 Ga. at 786-88, 642 S.E.2d at 6-8.
59. 2005 Ga. Laws 20, §§ 12-13 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. §§ 17-16-2(f), -4(a)(5),
-4(b)(3) (Supp. 2006)); 2005 Ga. Laws 474, § 1 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 17-162(a)-(e)).
60. 2005 Ga. Laws 20, § 17.
61. See Stinski, 281 Ga. at 786-88, 642 S.E.2d at 6-8.
62. See id. at 786, 642 S.E.2d at 6.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 787, 642 S.E.2d at 6 (citing Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973)).
67. Id., 642 S.E.2d at 7 (comparing the discovery requirements for defendants under
O.C.G.A. § 17-16-4(b)(3)(A)-(C) with the discovery requirements for the State under
O.C.G.A. §§ 17-16-2(f), -4(a)(5)).
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discovery in the sentencing phase as during the merits phase, its
discovery obligation "exactly mirrors the discovery required [by] the
defendant.. .. ,,6' The court also held that "the scope of non-statutory,
aggravating evidence is similarly broad" to the scope of mitigating
evidence and that any difference is "too minimal to be of constitutional
significance on the question of reciprocity of discovery." 9
The court summarily denied Stinski's remaining arguments regarding
the amended discovery procedure and denied his claim that the amended
discovery statute constituted an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder.7" Further, the court held that an inquiry into whether Stinski
made a valid waiver of his rights was irrelevant because the additional
discovery requirements were imposed by the general assembly rather
than the trial court.71 The court denied all other claims and, accordingly, affirmed the judgment of the lower court.72
B.

Direct Appeal Cases

The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed three capital cases on direct
appeal.73 The first is a pretrial direct appeal from an order of nolle
prosequi regarding one of two indictments brought against a defendant
by the State.74 It is a noteworthy case because it established that
defendants do not have a statutory right to plead guilty in criminal
cases. 5 The remaining two cases were appealed following conviction
and the imposition of the death penalty, and they were reviewed
pursuant to the automatic review procedure in Georgia's death penalty
statute.7" These latter cases do not present new issues of law due to
their posture. However, this Article briefly mentions certain portions to
emphasize the court's reasoning, which may be helpful in future cases

68. Id.
69. Id. at 788, 642 S.E.2d at 7.
70. Id., 642 S.E.2d at 7-8. The court held, without analysis, that the "amended statute
is not an ex post facto law because it affects purely procedural rights and duties." Id., 642
S.E.2d at 7. Due to the lack of analysis, it is unclear whether the court considered as an
argument that the procedural changes affected the substantial rights of the defendant,
which under the ex post facto doctrine may have amounted to error. See id.
71. Id., 642 S.E.2d at 8.
72. Id. at 788-89, 642 S.E.2d at 8.
73. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740 (2006); Williams v. State, 281 Ga. 87,
635 S.E.2d 146 (2006); Sanders v. State, 280 Ga. 780, 631 S.E.2d 344 (2006).
74. Sanders, 280 Ga. at 780, 631 S.E.2d at 344.
75. See id. at 783-84, 631 S.E.2d at 346-47.
76. See generally Walker, 281 Ga. 157, 635 S.E.2d 740; Williams, 281 Ga. 87, 635 S.E.2d
146.
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when claims have not been waived by trial counsel or are adequately
framed on appeal.
7
Donald Steve Sanders was indicted on DecemIn Sanders v. State,"
ber 15, 2004, by a Gwinnett County grand jury for malice murder and
other crimes in connection with the death of Doris Joyner. On the same
day, the grand jury returned a second indictment against Sanders for
felony murder and armed robbery of Joyner. On March 4, 2005, the
State filed its notice of intent to seek the death penalty in the first
indictment. Sanders was arraigned on charges in the first indictment
on May 13, 2005, and he entered a plea of not guilty. Sanders postponed
his arraignment on the second indictment to seek different counsel. At
the reset arraignment on July 18, 2005, Sanders's attorney announced
that Sanders would enter a plea of guilty to the second indictment
because the State did not file a notice to seek the death penalty on the
second indictment.7" Sanders's attorney tendered a signed indictment
to the court and a petition to enter a non-negotiated plea, requesting the
court to "'sentence accordingly."'7 9
The trial court questioned the State about its reason for maintaining
the second indictment and stayed the hearing to consider the issue and
allow the State to respond. Later the same day, the hearing was
resumed and the State requested an order of nolle prosequi regarding
the second indictment. The State noted that it intended the second
indictment to be an alternative to the first indictment on which the
State was seeking the death penalty. Sanders objected on the basis that
the trial court did not have discretion to reject his pleas. The trial court
allowed both parties time to file briefs on the issue, and on August 18,
2005, the trial court entered an order of nolle prosequi on the second
indictment.80
The State first complained that the Georgia Supreme Court did not
have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because: (1) there was no judgment
subject to direct appeal, and (2) if there was a judgment subject to direct
appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals would be the appropriate reviewing
court because Sanders had not been convicted of a capital felony.8 ' The
court dismissed the latter basis, holding that because the case involved
an indictment for murder, jurisdiction was appropriate in the Georgia
Supreme Court despite the fact that the case was in a pretrial pos-

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

280 Ga. 780, 631 S.E.2d 344 (2006).
Id. at 780-81, 631 S.E.2d at 344-45.
Id. at 781, 631 S.E.2d at 345.
Id.
Id.
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ture. s2 Regarding the State's complaint that an order of nolle prosequi
is not a judgment subject to direct appeal, the court first noted that
when a prosecuting attorney recommends an order of nolle prosequi, it
8
is within the trial court's discretion whether or not to grant it. 3
Additionally, the court noted that "an order of nolle prosequi may be
entered without the consent of the accused at any time prior to the
attachment of jeopardy."84 In Sanders's case, because jeopardy had not
attached at the time the court entered the nolle prosequi order, it was
within the power of the trial court to grant the order.8 ' The court
86
further noted that a defendant "may appeal such an order as final."
The court next addressed Sanders's argument that the trial court was
87
required to accept his pleas of guilty to the second indictment.
Sanders conceded that there is not a federal constitutional right to plead
guilty but argued that such a right existed under state statutory law and
pursuant to the Georgia Uniform Superior Court Rules. 8 Sanders first
argued that O.C.G.A. section 17-7-939 confers a right to plead guilty,
but the court rejected this argument and stated that this code section
merely provides for the sequence of events during an arraignment
process. 90 To support its rejection of Sanders's argument, the court
quoted Pass v. State,9 which concerned a similar issue under the
predecessor statute to O.C.G.A. section 17-7-93:
"A plea of guilty is but a confession of guilt in open court and a waiver
of trial ....
[I]t ought to be scanned with care and received with
caution. The judge is not bound to receive such a plea at all, and in
capital cases frequently declines to do so."92
The court concluded that O.C.G.A. section 17-7-93, therefore, did not
require the trial court to accept Sanders's pleas.93

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
S.E.2d
93.

Id. at 782, 631 S.E.2d at 345.
Id.
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 17-8-3 (2004)).
Id., 631 S.E.2d at 346.
Id. (citing Layman v. State, 280 Ga. 794, 631 S.E.2d 107 (2006)).
See id.
Id.; GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 30.2, 33.2, 33.10.
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-93 (2004).
Sanders, 280 Ga. at 783, 631 S.E.2d at 346.
227 Ga. 730, 182 S.E.2d 779 (1971).
Sanders, 280 Ga. at 783, 631 S.E.2d at 346 (quoting Pass, 227 Ga. at 730, 182
at 782).
Id.
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Sanders also argued that O.C.G.A. section 17-10-32.19' provides a
statutory right to plead guilty.95 The court rejected this argument as
well, noting that the statute provides for "the duties of the judge in
sentencing a person who is subject to the death penalty or life without
parole upon a plea of guilty."96 The court noted that the statute was
clear, indicating that a defendant "'may' enter a plea of guilty" but that
acceptance of the plea was within the discretion of the trial judge.97
The court also rejected Sanders's argument that Uniform Superior
Court Rules 30.2,9 33.1, 99 and 33.10 00° "create a 'legal right' to
plead guilty."1"' The court held that Rule 30.2 "merely provides the
procedure for the call for arraignment." °2 The court also held that
10 3
Rules 33.1 and 33.10 did not create an implicit right to plead guilty.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. 1 4
In Williams v. State,1°' Joseph Williams pleaded guilty to malice
murder, and following a sentencing trial before a jury, he was sentenced
to death. Williams sought review solely on the basis of the trial court's
denial of his motions challenging the validity of Georgia's death penalty
statutes. First, Williams argued that the lethal injection procedure
employed by Georgia is cruel and unusual punishment under both the
federal and state constitutions.0 6 The court denied this claim, holding
that Williams "failed to identify any particular aspect of the evidence
admitted in the trial court that would require this Court to depart from
its prior decisions
holding lethal injection to be a constitutional form of
10 7
execution."

The court also rejected Williams's other challenges to Georgia's death
penalty statutes because the remaining claims were "'so lacking in
specific argument that they [were] incapable of being meaningfully
discussed' and [were], therefore, deemed abandoned."0 8 The court
then conducted the required statutory review and held that Williams's

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

O.C.G.A. § 17-10-32.1 (2004).
Sanders, 280 Ga. at 783, 631 S.E.2d at 346.
Id. at 783-84, 631 S.E.2d at 346.
Id. at 784, 631 S.E.2d at 346-47 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 17-10-32.1).
GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 30.2.
GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 33.1.
GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 33.10.
Sanders, 280 Ga. at 784, 631 S.E.2d at 347.
Id.
Id.
Id.
281 Ga. 87, 635 S.E.2d 146 (2006).
Id. at 87-88, 90, 635 S.E.2d at 147, 149.
Id.
Id. (quoting Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 269, 587 S.E.2d 613, 626 (2003)).
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death sentence was neither excessive nor disproportionate and was not
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary
factor." 9
Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment.110
In Walker v. State,"' Gregory Walker was convicted of malice
murder and related firearms charges, and a jury sentenced him to
death. 2 The court summarily denied a number of Walker's claims
without analysis because the issues were either resolved by prior
decisions of the court, or Walker failed
to support his claims with any
113
argument or citation to authority.
The first claim the court reviewed was whether the State failed to
timely notify Walker of the statutory aggravating circumstances it
intended to rely upon in seeking a death sentence because the State
failed to allege them in the indictment." 4 The court acknowledged
that this issue had been previously decided in Terrell v. State;"..
however, the court noted that while the State complied with the
procedure within the Unified Appeal Procedure by timely announcing its
intent to seek the death penalty, the State did not inform Walker of the
statutory aggravating circumstances it intended to prove at trial until
the first day of voir dire." 6 Nonetheless, the court held that even if
this amounted to a constitutional violation, it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." 7 In support of its holding, the court noted that the
indictment contained a separate charge alleging that the murder was
committed while Walker was engaged in a kidnapping involving bodily
injury," 8 which the State relied upon and the jury found beyond a
reasonable doubt." 9
The court, therefore, concluded that Walker
received sufficient notice of this aggravating circumstance and held that
2
there was no error.1 0
The court also reviewed a number of claims alleging the improper
excusal of prospective jurors.'12 Walker argued that the trial court
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erroneously excused nine prospective jurors for cause due to their
purported opposition to the death penalty.'2 2 The court noted that the
proper standard in reviewing such claims is "'whether the juror's views
would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as
a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."'128 The court
also noted that it must review the prospective juror's voir dire testimony
as a whole and accord deference to the trial court where responses are
equivocal.124
Upon the court's review of the claim that prospective juror Dutton was
improperly excused, the record showed that while Dutton initially
indicated that he could consider the death penalty as a sentencing
option, he later vacillated and stated he did not know if he would vote
for death. 25 After further questioning by the trial court, Dutton stated
that "the death penalty was against his nature" and indicated that he
The court
could not vote for it regardless of the circumstances. 2
noted that the trial court relied in large part on Dutton's demeanor and
body language in making its determination.'2 7 The court accorded
deference to the trial court's findings, and after reviewing Dutton's
held that there was no abuse of
testimony as a whole, the court
28
discretion in disqualifying him.
On review of Walker's claim that prospective juror Rodgers was
improperly disqualified, the record showed that while Rodgers initially,
albeit hesitantly, stated that he could consider voting for death in some
circumstances, he later went on to state that "he believed his reservations about the death penalty Would interfere with his ability to
realistically consider it as a punishment option .... ,12' Rodgers then
went one step further, indicating that he could not vote for death under
any circumstances and would, instead, always opt for a sentence of life
with or without the possibility of parole."' 0 The court held that in view

122. Id. at 162, 635 S.E.2d at 746.
123. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Greene v. State, 268
Ga. 47, 48, 485 S.E.2d 741, 743 (1997)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 162-63, 635 S.E.2d at 746-47.
126. Id. at 162, 635 S.E.2d at 746.
127. Id. at 162-63, 635 S.E.2d at 746. Such a holding was supported in the recent case
of Uttecht v. Brown, 127 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2007) (holding that deference is owed to the
trial court which "is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the
individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and
qualifications of potential jurors").
128. Walker, 281 Ga. at 163, 635 S.E.2d at 746-47.
129. Id., 635 S.E.2d at 747.
130. Id.
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of Rodgers's testimony as 1a31whole, the trial court was authorized to find
him unqualified to serve.
The court also denied Walker's claim that prospective jurors Brashier,
132
Aldridge, Geter, Alderman, and Porter were improperly disqualified.
According to the record, prospective juror Brashier "indicated that she
would automatically vote against" the imposition of death in any case,
regardless of the circumstances, even if the State proved the existence
33
of a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.'
Prospective juror Aldridge indicated he would not consider the death
penalty "under any circumstances."134 "Prospective juror Geter stated
that she was conscientiously opposed to the death penalty" and could not
consider any factors that might warrant death."3 5 Prospective juror
Alderman voiced her opposition to the death penalty and stated that she
could not consider death under any circumstances.' 36 Finally, prospective juror Porter was emphatic "that she could not consider the death
penalty under any circumstances.""' The court held that given the
testimony of each of these prospective jurors, "It]he trial court was
authorized to find that these jurors' views would prevent or substantially
impair the performance of their duties in accordance with their

instructions and oaths

.

Accordingly,
...,,138

the court held that there

was no error in disqualifying these prospective jurors. 9
The court also rejected Walker's argument that prospective jurors Lett
and Rowell were improperly disqualified because both stated that they
"would not consider life in prison without parole, regardless of the
circumstances." 4 ° The court held that the trial court did not err in
excusing them because they "gave the impression they would be unable
to apply the law faithfully and impartially."'
Walker next argued that he was entitled to a trial before a separate
jury on the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
Following the jury's verdict on the charges of malice murder and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, the trial court
conducted a separate trial before the same jury on the charge of
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possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 4 ' The court noted the
existence of a limited exception which bifurcates a charge of possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon from other charges arising from the
same conduct. 4" However, according to the court, it had never before
held and refused to hold here that a defendant was entitled to a separate
trial before a new jury on such a charge.'"
The court likewise denied Walker's argument that conducting the trial
on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon prior to the sentencing
phase of his capital murder trial prejudiced the jury by impermissibly
placing his character in issue. 45 The court held that because the State
could have introduced evidence of prior convictions during the sentencing
phase, it was not error to conduct the trial on this charge at the end of
the merits phase of Walker's capital murder trial.'46
Walker's final claim, concerning the charge of possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon, was that the evidence against him was insufficient
for a conviction because the only evidence the State submitted during
trial on this issue was a certified copy of Walker's indictment, his guilty
plea, and his sentence for the felony offense of theft by taking. 47 The
court denied this claim, stating that it was proper for the trial court to
instruct the jury that it was authorized to consider the evidence
presented during the merits phase of the capital murder trial, in
addition to the evidence introduced at the subsequent trial for possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon. 4 " The court held that by incorporating by reference the evidence from the merits phase of the capital
murder trial, "the jury was authorized to find that Walker possessed a
firearm" and that "[e]vidence of Walker's prior conviction of a felony
provided the additional element necessary for conviction."' 49 The court
denied Walker's remaining claims and affirmed the lower court's
judgment.' 50
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